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ABSTRACT
Children under 11 are often regarded as too young to compre-
hend the implications of online privacy. Perhaps as a result,
little research has focused on younger kids’ risk recogni-
tion and coping. Such knowledge is, however, critical for
designing efficient safeguarding mechanisms for this age
group. Through 12 focus group studies with 29 children aged
6-10 from UK schools, we examined how children described
privacy risks related to their use of tablet computers and
what information was used by them to identify threats. We
found that children could identify and articulate certain pri-
vacy risks well, such as information oversharing or revealing
real identities online; however, they had less awareness with
respect to other risks, such as online tracking or game promo-
tions. Our findings offer promising directions for supporting
children’s awareness of cyber risks and the ability to protect
themselves online.
∗Also with UCL Interaction Centre, University College London.
†Also with Anna Freud National Centre for Children & Families.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Today, children are spending more time online than with
other media sources, such as watching television or playing
offline video games [48, 60]. Among the many kinds of de-
vices now connected to the Internet, mobile devices (such as
tablet computers or smartphones) have become the primary
means by which children go online [48]. In the UK, 44% of
children aged five to ten have been provided with their own
tablets, with this percentage increasing annually [60], while
in the US, ownership of tablets by children in this age group
grew fivefold between 2011 and 2013 [2]. Children under
five are also using smartphone and tablets more often, as
the category of apps designed for younger kids continues to
expand rapidly [1, 60].
Whilst online content has opened up significant new op-
portunities and experiences for children to learn and have
fun [39, 58, 63, 67], parents and educators alike are raising
concerns about the rapid adoption of online content and apps
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by children, in particular as it relates to the amount of time
spent online, and online safety [36, 40, 47]. A recent survey
has shown that parents consider privacy their primary con-
cern regarding their children’s use of the Internet [47]. This
concern is driven, in part, by the view that children them-
selves are too young to understand the privacy risks they
might face [45, 49], which drives many parents to take a re-
strictive approach to filter or monitor their children’s online
activity [41, 83]. Indeed, recent studies show how children’s
ability to recognise risks online remains inadequate, and as
a result, the children are dependent on parents’ strategies
to keep them safe [41, 48, 50, 83]. Unfortunately, however,
parents themselves often feel they lack an adequate under-
standing of the landscape of potential risks online—ranging
from bullying to cybercrime—making them uncertain about
the effectiveness of their mediation approaches [49].
We feel that it is important to understand children’s pri-
vacy behaviours and conceptualisations not only because it
might identify conceptual gaps in understanding that lead to
better ways to educate and protect children online, but also
because such behaviours have been shown to be indicative
of later behaviours and attitudes [40, 41, 78]. To this end,
we build on recent work examining children’s perceptions
of online privacy risks [26, 41, 53, 83], and extend existing
literature in two ways: first, by examining in detail how chil-
dren describe certain common kinds of risks, for the purpose
of understanding their conceptualisations of them; second,
we examine the risk coping strategies taken by the children
for each distinct risk context. Specifically, we focus on the
following three research questions:
• R1: Perception - Do children care about privacy online?
When they do, how do they describe privacy risks?
• R2: Recognition - How do children recognise risks?
What information do they use in the process?
• R3: Response - How do children apply their existing
knowledge in responding to risks in different scenar-
ios, including threats they never experienced before?
What do such responses suggest about information
and knowledge that might be needed?
We report our results based on 12 focus groupswith 29 chil-
dren, aged 6-10, from UK schools undertaken between June
and August 2018. We found that children in our study had a
good understanding of risks related to inappropriate content,
the approach of strangers, and oversharing of personal infor-
mation online. However, they struggled to fully understand
and describe risks related to online game/video promotions
and personal data tracking. Moreover, children’s risk coping
strategies depended on their understanding of the risks and
their previous experiences: effective risk strategies were ap-
plied only if children recognised certain risks or when they
felt something untoward. These findings demonstrate the
importance of learning about potential risks through a mul-
titude of channels, such as school, parents, friends, siblings,
and personal experiences [34, 81].
We identified significant gaps in children’s current aware-
ness and understanding of two major forms of online risk: (i)
online recommendations, and (ii) implications of data track-
ing, i.e., the recording and sharing of data pertaining to what
they do online. Children remain poorly equipped to identify
targeted promotional material online, including adverts and
in-app promotions, exploiting tracked activity data. We offer
recommendations on the development of tools to facilitate
children’s understanding of privacy risks, and the need to
extend children’s awareness of implicit personal data access,
which is becoming ever more prevalent in the games and
content they encounter [13, 20, 65].
2 BACKGROUND
Children’s Perception of Privacy
Privacy has been described as a “concept in disarray”[69]
reflecting the complex and often overlapping conceptualisa-
tions. O’Hara proposed “seven veils” of privacy, spanning
the conceptual, factual, phenomenological, preferential, so-
cietal, legal, and moral [61]. Practical research in privacy
has typically spanned multiple such veils; Livingstone sug-
gests that privacy is related to the keeping of information
out of the public domain or the effective determination of
what personal information is made available to whom [44].
Nissenbaum’s theory of Contextual Integrity (CI) frames
privacy as “the right to appropriate flow of personal informa-
tion" [59] where what is “appropriate” is based on particular
contexts and relationships. CI has been found to be a use-
ful practical framework to interpret people’s perceptions of
privacy [10, 43].
Managing privacy is becoming increasingly challenging,
given the vast (and growing) information asymmetries of
the digital age [7], where data about people are harvested by
powerful platforms and vast networks in ways they do not
understand nor recognise. Children are particularly suscepti-
ble in part due to them having little sense of the risks posed
by the accumulation of personal data over time [62]. The
combination of such a lack of understanding, with incentives
put in place by apps and platforms to get people to share
their data, have yielded the so-called ‘privacy paradox’, a
behaviour studied in teenagers [14] and adults [11] alike,
in which individuals act in ways contrary to their stated
privacy preferences and concerns [37, 38, 62]. Recent studies
showed that although teenagers from 14 to 18 were typi-
cally concerned about being personally identified by their
personal data, they failed to perceive the potential threat of
re-identification via the particular fragments they shared,
e.g., images or geo-location [62].
Whilst there has been extensive research on teenagers’
perceptions of privacy, relatively little has been done for
children aged below 11. They have often been perceived as
being too young to understand privacy or exercise digital
independence online [47]. However, developmental research
has shown that children can develop a “theory of mind" by
the age of 4 [19], which enables children to recognise the dif-
ferences between concepts in their minds and those in others,
and hence to grasp complicated concepts like “secrecy” [19]
or “deception” [17]. Contrary to common expectations, chil-
dren value their privacy because this enables them to enjoy
their experience online [41, 68], such as socialising with their
friends and families or experimenting with new games.
Recent research with 14 Canadian families showed that
children aged 7-11 can align online privacy with real-world
scenarios such as “being left alone" or “hiding secrets", and
draw an analogy to the online environment through expres-
sions like “keeping things to yourself" or “not talking to
strangers" [83]. Kumar et al. [41] unpacked the perception of
online privacy for 26 US young children and examined how
they were able to recognise sensitive entities (such as pass-
words) but struggled with identifying risky actors (strangers)
involved in questionable contexts. These studies provide use-
ful insights into children’s perception of risks, i.e. what they
think of as being risky, and what they struggle to recognise;
however, they do not tell us how children make these judge-
ments - or whether children can in fact identify a threat and
its origination.
Managing Children’s Privacy Online
Tools developed for managing children’s privacy on mobile
platforms usually comprise features that monitor and restrict
children’s online activities [46, 60, 77]. Children often find
these tools overly restrictive and invasive of their personal
privacy [30, 77]. Co-design studies with children under 12
show that they prefer technologies that facilitate their risk
coping skill development, promote communication and inter-
action with their parents, and emphasise restrictions around
monitoring [53]. However, such tools are still scarce.
Several recent studies have recognised the importance of
supporting children’s learning through approaches like in-
teractive storytelling [82], game playing [52] or co-learning
with parents [34]. They have shown the effectiveness of in-
creasing children’s awareness of related online safety issues,
such as online personal identity or content appropriateness.
This demonstrates that a knowledge scaffolding approach
to a child’s means of dealing with privacy risk coping could
provide a useful addition to safeguarding their cybersafety.
Developmental Stages of Privacy Concepts
Children’s ability to recognise privacy risks may be intrin-
sically limited by their developmental stage. At ages 3 to 5
years, children start to build up friendships; however, at this
stage, family interactions are dominant, and many of their
online activities are still parent-guided [40]. At this stage,
peer pressure is less of an influence [9]. Children from 6 to 9,
however, start to learn about the complexity of relationships
and feel the need to fit in to peer social groups [9]. They
are also more involved in online activities and enjoy playing
games with their friends [40]. This social interaction with
peers makes them more aware of interpersonal privacy risks,
but less of other privacy risks [40]. So while they often care
deeply about their personal information being shared with
their peers, parents, and others online, they remain unaware
of other actors, including platforms, app designers, malicious
actors, and others operating in digital ecosystems [50, 62].
Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is a the-
ory that relates the difference between what learners can do
independently to what can be achieved by through guidance
by a skilled partner [16]. It has been applied to assess the ef-
fectiveness of teaching and learning [55], to identify key bar-
riers in learning by understanding knowledge gaps [22], and
in the design of better intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) [64].
Inspired by ZPD, we focus on identifying children’s miscon-
ceptions of privacy risks and highlighting areas of knowledge
that could be developed through future active scaffolding.
3 STUDY DESIGN
Given our focus on understanding children’s ability to recog-
nise privacy-related contexts by examining how they de-
scribe them, we chose the focus group method to elicit chil-
dren’s responses to a collection of hypothetical scenarios
that reflect different types of explicit and implicit threats to
children’s online personal data privacy.
Focus Groups with Children
The role of children in research is increasingly recognised,
as children are key stakeholders in modern digital technolo-
gies [23]. Focus groups put children at the centre of the
research, and encourage the sharing of their perspectives
and experiences [31, 32, 57]. They are often used to facili-
tate group dialogues around the topic of interest and result
in findings that cannot be obtained through individual in-
terviews [70]. Focus groups have been successfully used to
study children’s experiences in different fields, such as health
sciences (e.g. studying children’s experience of living with
asthma [57]), in sociology (e.g. studying children’s experi-
ences with bullying [33, 56]), or in understanding children’s
experiences with technology [24, 26, 27].
These previous studies have demonstrated that using focus
groups with children can reduce the influence of adults, and
encourage children to keep each other on track and truthful.
However, conducting focus groups can be challenging, given
the power dynamics amongst the children and the different
forms of expression preferred by different children. Based
on the experiences of several previous focus groups with
children under 11 [26, 57], we took the following decisions
in our study design: 1) keeping children from the same age
group together; 2) using role playing to relax children and
balance the power between the adult and children; and 3)
providing options for children to express themselves using
other methods like pen and paper.
Scenarios
In our focus group discussions, we chose to walk through
a series of hypothetical scenarios with participant children,
about a cartoon character named Bertie, an 8-year-old koala
bear who likes playing with tablets, but is not always certain
how to cope with unusual events taking place during his use
of the mobile apps (see Figure 1). Hypothetical scenarios are
effective ways of collecting children’s perception of online
security and privacy [41], by making them feel they are not
being judged [73, 79].
Our scenarios were carefully designed to contrast explicit
versus implicit data collection in a familiar versus unfamil-
iar technology context. Previous research has shown that
children under 11 particularly struggle to understand risks
posed by technologies or comprehend the context of being
online [41, 83]. They have explored how children responded
to explicit data requests such as in-app pop-ups; while our
study also looks into children’s awareness and perception
of implicit data access through third-party tracking, which
leads to personalised online promotions.
Story 1 — Implicit video promotions are widely found in
applications like social video sharing platforms, which can
be based on personal viewing history or a viewers’ interests.
Online promotions on such platforms are a significant means
bywhich children discover games or video channels, material
that is not always appropriate for their age or developmental
needs [48]. Therefore, story 1 aimed to assess how much
children are aware of the video promotion behaviours of
online platforms, some of which could be based on children’s
online activities, including the videos they have watched or
the games they enjoy playing.
Story 2 — In-app pop-ups can explicitly prompt children
for personal information (such as names, age or voices) be-
fore they can continue with the game. Story 2 aimed to assess
children’s awareness of explicit stranger danger and in-app
game promotions, which can be personalised based on their
online data.
Story 3 — The large number of applications (‘apps’) that
can be downloaded for free are a major way by which chil-
dren interact with these devices. Currently these ‘free’ apps
are largely supported by monetisation of user’s personal in-
formation [8, 43]. A large amount of personal information
and online behaviour may be collected from children’s apps
and shared with third party online marketing and advertis-
ing entities [65]. This scenario is designed to examine how
children perceive and feel about these risks.
Scenario 1 and 3 are closely related to children’s ability to
comprehend the impacts of data-driven decision-making, i.e.
their ‘big data’ literacy [25]. Previous research has shown
that children aged 8-16 were capable of critiquing analytics
applied to the data about them [35] and recognise issues re-
lated to algorithmic accuracy and fairness. Our study comple-
ments previous research by looking into how much children
aged 6-10 are aware of the context in which their personal
data may be collected, transmitted to other online actors,
and then used to drive algorithm-based decision-makings.
4 STUDY METHOD
Participants were recruited from both local primary schools
and a public forum for advertising local family events. Re-
cruitment started inMay 2018 after obtaining ethics approval,
and 12 studies were carried out between June and August
2018. Half of the studies took place on school premises dur-
ing school term time, and the other half in our university
premises during the summer holiday period. At school, a
school teacher or teaching assistant was present in the room,
at the university, parents left the children in the room and
waited outside until the study was completed. The majority
of the participants were recruited through schools and school
newsletters. Each study was facilitated by one researcher
along with two note-takers.
Study Process
Each focus group study contained four parts, including a
warm-up and introduction session, a sharing of favourite
apps, a walk-through of the hypothetical risk scenarios, and
finally an open-ended session about issues not so far dis-
cussed. The whole study was planned to last around 1 hour
and each part of the study was designed to be fun and framed
as a game. We avoided using words like ‘dangerous’ or ‘sus-
picious’ in our scenarios.
The warm-up session included a game of “throwing a
ball" [57] and invited everyone in the room to share their
favourite colour and food with the others. The session nor-
mally lasted 10 minutes. It helped participants, particularly
young children, to relax. Then we used an iPad to ask chil-
dren to show us their favourite apps, or search for them
in the app store if they could not find them on our device.
Children were then asked to comment on why they liked the
app. This gave us insight about what children in our study
enjoyed doing online and their positive experiences.
During the session discussing the three hypothetical sce-
narios, we let everyone choose a soft toy in the room and
role played a character each, such as Bertie’s sibling, parent
or teacher, in order to help participants (particularly quiet
Figure 1: Three hypothetical scenarios for focus group discussion (original story cards were in colour): (a) shows a video
promotion scenario; (b) illustrates an in-app pop-up requesting children’s inputs; and (c) depicts how children’s personal data
could be tracked and sent to third parties without their knowledge or explicit consent.
children) feel they are not being judged [57]. In each hypo-
thetical scenario, children were first given some time to read
through the printed story cards (as illustrated in Figure 1). If
they had trouble, one of the note-takers would provide help
and read along with them1. While children were first asked
to respond to the predefined questions, like what will you do
or what do you think Bertie should do, our facilitator followed
up any responses that required further clarifications (such
as what do you mean by “hacking”). This session also en-
couraged children to share their personal experience related
to the scenarios, by asking questions like whether this has
happened to them and what you did. This enabled us to listen
to children’s descriptions of their experiences not covered
in the scenarios.
Audio and video recordings were taken during the studies;
two note-takers provided additional details about key inter-
actions they observed. Video recordings were played back
during the transcription and data analysis phases to highlight
any notable interaction patterns between participants.
Participant Information
We had 29 participant children, including 14 boys and 15
girls, with an average age of 8.5 (range = 6-10, s.d. = 1.4).
Details about participants can be found in Table 1. In total
we had 12 focus group and the group size varied between 2
and 4 [29], with an average group size of 2.4.
1Reading literacy is widely promoted in the U.K. for children aged 4 years
and above. The story cards were written in as simple a language as possible
and were tested with children aged 6yo.
Children in our study were generally more attracted to
‘fun’ games that they found exciting or could learn new
things from. They were also influenced by friends and fami-
lies on the choice of apps (‘so that I can play with friends’).
25/29 children owned their tablets or phones, while the rest
used their parents’ devices or shared with their siblings. On-
line promotions (e.g in-app promotions, app store adverts,
YouTube videos) had influenced many children’s choice of
apps; 20/29 children reported that they have seen promotions
in their games or videos, and 12 children reported that they
found their favourites or installed new games through these
means.
Age #Boys #Girls #Total
6-yo 4 0 4
7-yo 1 0 1
8-yo 3 3 6
9-yo 3 4 7
10-yo 3 8 11
Table 1: Summary of participants’ ages and genders
5 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
We transcribed the interviews and analysed the data in two
iterations. In the first iteration, we used a thematic analysis
method to develop codes and themes related to risks talked
about by the children and how they coped with them.
The thematic coding process started by dividing the tran-
scriptions into two (roughly) equal-sized sets. The first three
authors independently analysed the first set of transcriptions
to derive an initial set of codes. Then they met to consolidate
and reconcile codes into a common codebook. These codes
were then applied to the second (yet unseen) set of transcrip-
tions by the same set of researchers, and Fleiss’ kappa [28]
(0.83) was computed to assess inter-coder reliability.
In the second iteration, we used the CI framework, particu-
larly its four-parametermodel, to examine the risks identified
by the children (either from our hypothetical scenarios or
their own experiences with technologies) and how they were
described by the children. The four parameters from the CI
framework include the following:
• Attributes: the types of information being transmitted,
such as users’ data, personal information, etc.
• Contexts: the situation or scenario to which the social
norms may be applied.
• Actors: the entities involved in the information trans-
mission, which can be the subject, sender or recipient
of the information.
• Transmission principles: the way information is trans-
mitted from the sender of information to the recipients.
This four-parameter model helped us to calibrate whether
children recognised the exact actors, attributes, context and
information transmissions involved in each risk context, led
us to delineate three categories of risk recognition by chil-
dren, namely accurate, vague and missed risk recognition.
6 RESULTS
We present our results by first outlining children’s use of
language under each category of risk recognition (i.e. recog-
nised, vaguely or missed). We then present an overview of
children’s responses to the three hypothetical scenarios, be-
fore providing in-depth analysis regarding children’s risk
coping strategies when risks were recognised, vaguely un-
derstood or missed. In this way, we demonstrate an under-
standing of children’s current knowledge gaps in describing
and coping with risks.
Children’s Use of Language Under Each Category of
Risk Recognition
We observed that some terms were repeatedly used by chil-
dren across different situations. Moreover, as shown by the
examples in Table 2, children were able to describe risks
accurately when they could recognise the actual risks. How-
ever, when they had only a vague understanding of the risks,
they struggled to describe things consistently or to provide
a good explanation of what they meant.
Good risk recognition and accurate description
When children recognised the actual risks, such as inappro-
priate content or over-sharing of personal information, they
could describe them quite accurately, for example, using
terms like ‘personal information’ or ‘private information’ to
refer to the type of information they treated as sensitive;
or words like ‘things for adults’ or ‘not my age’ to refer to
content that was inappropriate to them.
Vague risk recognition and inconsistent descriptions
When children only made a partial sense of certain types of
risks, their use of terms can be inconsistent. For example,
although some children were able to describe the scenario of
new videos being presented to Bertie using words like ‘peo-
ple trying tomakemoney’ or ‘them trying tomake youwatch
more’, they struggled to explain who these ‘people’ are and
how information might be transmitted to these ‘[YouTube]
channel people’ in this context. Another example is the term
‘hacking’, which has been used by children across differ-
ent focus groups, but in fact with very different meanings.
For example, when trying to explain why a new video was
shown following a previous video, children used ‘hacking’ to
mean ‘someone stole my data’, ‘take your account’, or ‘steal
from house’. ‘Hacking’ has been used by the same group of
children to make sense of other scenarios, including in-app
pop-ups or data tracking.
Feelings and experiences, but no recognition of risks
When children could not describe the exact risks they en-
countered, they would refer to a feeling of ‘scary’ or ‘an-
noying’ to talk about times when they felt a need to take an
action. Children also referred to things they ‘had experienced
before’ when they could not describe why something made
them take actions. This indicates that although sometimes
children probably did not fully comprehend their previous
experiences, the consequences provided a signpost for them
to stop [37].
Children’s Responses to the Hypothetical Scenarios
Table 3 summarises how children responded to our three
hypothetical scenarios:
• In the video-related scenario of story 1, which aimed
to assess children’s awareness of (personalised) game
promotions, children largely missed these risks and
associated this context with ‘autoplay’ or computers
trying to ‘save your time’; only three groups associated
this context with YouTubers trying to ‘make money’. 9
out of 12 groups suggested that they would ‘play and
see’, and half of the groups suggested that Bertie should
tell his parents. However, when asked what they would
do in this scenario, all but one of the groups would
play the video and make a judgment by themselves,
instead of seeking advice from their parents.
• Story 2 aimed to assess children’s awareness of stranger
danger and in-app game promotions, which again can
be personalised. Apart from one group, all children
agreed that pop-ups should be treated with caution,
whilst they made different interpretations of pop-ups,
Context Risks Words Children’s explanation of the meanings
Inappropriate content weird things things for adult, not my age
Threats from strangers strangers, random people, or I don’t knowRisks recognised
Person information over-sharing personal information everything about me, my stuff, personal photos
Online promotions Channel people, app developers I don’t knowRisks vaguely understood get more subscribers more money and more famous
Pop-ups hacking steal from house, take your account, steal your data
Data tracking hacking track your personal information
tracking try and find you, find your location, know more about what’s happening in this country
No risks specified scary, angry, upset, annoying, surprised
Table 2: Example descriptions of risks felt, experienced, recognised or interpreted by children.
Context Bertie should? You would? Why?
Story 1 Play-and-see, or
tell parents
Play-and-see,
or continue
(because it is
fun)
autoplay, making
it easier (to watch),
based on past his-
tory, people mak-
ing money
Story 2 Stop, delete, or
tell parents
Shut off or
delete
hack you, trick
you, steal the voice,
access personal
information
Story 3 Stop, tell par-
ents, or do some
research
Stop my information,
depending the
companies
Table 3: Children’s responses to hypothetical scenarios —
what to do and why
which could be ‘hacking’ (i.e. ‘stealing their informa-
tion or voice data’) or ‘tricking them to buy things’.
Even though the perception of risks differed, all chil-
dren suggested that both Bertie and they should go
and tell someone about this, or immediately delete or
stop using the app.
• For story 3, which focused on the tracking behaviour
of apps, an aspect still largely unfamiliar to adults
and children alike, ‘telling parents’ and ‘discussing
with parents’ were suggested by 10/12 groups as the
coping strategies, even though children didn’t fully
understand who might access this tracked data. A few
older children (9-10 yo) also suggested that they would
do some further research with their parents to figure
out what kind of information might be collected or
who the companies might be that were receiving this
information. All children said that Bertie should stop
using the app and theywould stop using their favourite
apps too.
Risk Coping When Risks Were Accurately
Recognised
Children demonstrated a strong consciousness of their online
identity and the importance of avoiding sharing their real
identity or over-sharing their personal information. In these
cases, children applied various effective strategies to protect
their sensitive personal information. For example, a 10-yo
girl demonstrated her knowledge of using an obfuscation
strategy to protect her real identity online:
‘I make up a name cause I don’t want people
know my name’ – C6, a 10-yo girl
Others mentioned techniques they would use to verify the
identity of anyone who tried to contact them online:
‘If I know who they are and they told me their
names and accounts, and if they askme in person
to friend them, then I would friend them. If I
don’t know who they are and haven’t seen them
in real life then I wouldn’t accept them’ – C14,
a 9-yo girl
These risk coping strategies are effectively applied by the
children when they face explicit inappropriate content or an
explicit request for their personal information from platforms
or apps. However, our analysis showed that children may
struggle to fully understand risks in other contexts. In the
following sections, we unpack how children responded to
situations when they struggled to recognise or understand
the risks fully, summarised in Table 4.
Risk Coping When Risks Were Vaguely Understood
In contrast to explicit privacy risks, children struggled to
associated online promotions with losing control of personal
information. The effectiveness of their risk coping may vary
— they may be cautious even though not fully understanding
risks, or open to try-it-and-see strategies.
Open to Recommendations
Several children discussed their interpretation of how YouTu-
bersmay try to ‘persuade’ them towatch their videos in order
to gain ‘money’ or ‘more subscribers’. For example, a group
of 8-yos shared their knowledge about how the number of
subscribers to an online video could be related to the reward
to the video publisher.
‘C12: eurgh, they get money and they get more
famous
C10: if you watch their video a lot, then they get
a lot of thumbs ups of their videos
C13: they have lots of subscribers’
However, none of these children expressed resistance to
these video promotions. They treated it as if this is how the
Internet works – ‘if they reach the max subscribers, then
they get the money’ (C12). Their primary decision making
Context Descriptions and examples Children’s risk coping strategies
Risks recognised
inappropriate content
request for sensitive personal information
approaching by strangers
ask for help
stop
avoid oversharing
Online promotions == recommendations it’s ok, let’s play
Tracking == hacking stopask for helpRisks vaguely understood
Pop-ups == hacking stopask for help
New videos == auto play it’s ok, let’s play
Familiar YouTuber/games == Ok it’s ok, let’s playRisks missed
I/My friends played it before == Ok it’s ok, let’s play
Table 4: Children’s Risk Coping Strategies Depending on Their Ability to Recognise Risk Contexts
was still based on whether the content was interesting or
whether it was from their favourite video providers.
Play-and-See When Not Fully Recognising Recommendations
Only a few children (3/12 focus groups) recognised how new
videos might be related to personalised recommendations.
One group of 10-yo children used the word ‘recommenda-
tion’ to describe video promotions on YouTube. However,
they struggled to understand who was performing these rec-
ommendations, and as a result, they were less sure about the
consequences for their privacy.
‘C2: because it recommended this.
C1: maybe he watched other videos like that.
and then this one popped up
R: how did you know about that?
C1: not sure’
As a result, the children usually applied the play-and-see
strategy to assess the content or apps they came across, with-
out any more complex reasoning.
Stop, Even Not Fully Recognising What Hacking Involves
Children associated a diverse range of scenarios with the
word ‘hacking’. Sometimes it was used deliberately to re-
fer to actions (or intentions) by app and platform designers,
rather than activities of computer criminals. For example,
the following description from a 10-yo girl referred to her
experience with location tracking by Snapchat. She under-
stood risks associated with location tracking, even though
she used the word ‘hacking’ to describe tracking behaviour
of the app:
‘Yeah, that’s why I put on ghost mode, so they
can’t find your location. So yeah, they try to hack
your tablet and they can get all the games you
like to play in, all the personal information, like
what school you go to’ – C5, a 10-yo girl
Other times, children might use the word to refer to being
personally coerced or made to take an action by an app or
service. For example, C24 (a 7-yo girl) tried to explain why
she thought Bertie should not watch the new video by saying
that
‘It is a bit random and just pops up ... someone
might be trying to hack you or something’. –
C24, a 7-yo girl
In such a situation, the concept was ‘hacking’ was used
to provide a possible explanation as to why or by whom
they were being made to take particular actions–which they
struggled to fully understand.
This was particularly common among younger children
under 8 (11/29), who could not explain what they meant by
‘hacking’ when this word was used in their interviews. In
these situations, because children recognised that ‘hacking’
is a bad thing, they would take effective action to either
stop or ask for help from parents, even though their actual
recognition of the risks were vague or misinformed.
Risk Coping When Risks Were Missed
Children could miss risks due to a lack of knowledge, or
due to their past experiences, which did not lead to any
direct consequences related to the risks. For those children
who interacted with certain technologies and experienced
no implications before, they would tend to be more (over-)
confident with technologies.
Associating New Videos with ‘Autoplay’
Children from 7 focus groups treated online video promo-
tions as part of an ‘autoplay’ function of the platform, with-
out questioning how the new content might be presented
to them. 12/29 children demonstrated trust in the content
provided by their familiar YouTubers. For example, C4 (a
10-yo girl) mentioned that ‘because it’s one of my favourite
YouTubers. So I was ok with it’.
As a result, children reported having been exposed to
unexpected content and online baiting. These same children
reported that they often saw upsetting content online (e.g.
‘sometimes in autoplay, it comes up with these really freaky
ones like pictures of dead people ’ — C5, a 10-yo girl). 12
(out of 29) children in our study reported how their favourite
games were discovered through promotions in the videos
they watched (‘A friend and I were watching YouTube and
we saw people playing this game.’ – C14, a 8-yo girl).
Familiarity Overwrites Rules
Our data also shows that familiarity could give children a
fake sense of safety. For example, C3 (a 10-yo girl) mentioned
that ‘I don’t think YouTube and stuff like that could collect
much’, and another two 10-yo girls discussed how their ex-
periences with a known app had a strong influence on their
judgement upon whether an app could pose threats to them
or not.
‘C8: It depends on what game it is. If it’s like
the talking Tom, then that’s fine because you’re
safe.
C9: Yes, cause it doesn’t record you and keeps it.
C8:Because I play it all the time and nothing has
happened to me and I’m always talking to it. I
haven’t had any problem with my ipad
c9: Yes me too, I’ve been playing with it for one
to two years and haven’t had any problem.’
Experience-Centric Decision Making
We also observed that a child’s or their peers’ personal ex-
periences had a strong influence upon their decision making,
even though they didn’t always understand what may pose
threats to them. The following example illustrates how chil-
dren in our study demonstrated that they used experiences
as a heuristics for their decision making, as described by C27,
a 10-yo girl, ‘If my friends already play it I wouldn’t bother
checking it cause they know it’s safe. If it’s one I didn’t know
about then I wouldn’t use the app’.
7 DISCUSSIONS
Key Findings and Contributions
Our results reinforce existing findings that children under
11 struggle to fully understand online privacy risks [15, 26,
40, 41, 83], especially those associated with implicit personal
data collection and use, through mechanisms such as data
tracking or in-app recommendations. However, our results
also demonstrate that children cared about, and were sensi-
tive to, whomight access their sensitive information (e.g. real
names, age, location etc), and applied a range of techniques to
safeguard this space, such as by verifying identities through
face-to-face interactions or avoiding using real names as
usernames. Children felt ‘annoyed’, ‘surprised’ or ‘angry’
when they felt coerced, or felt not in control. Our results
also reinforced that, like teenagers and younger children, our
participants valued the positive experiences of being online
and keeping in touch with their friends, and their personal
space online [51].
Implications for Designing for Children
It is clear that current digital technologies are often not
designed with children’s best interests in mind. For exam-
ple, social media platforms widely used by children (such
as Instagram or Twitter) keep their profile pages as public
by default[6], and games from the ‘family’ genre from the
leading mobile app markets are associated with more third-
party trackers than games designed for adults [13, 66]. For
younger children, smart toys and connected baby monitors
can continuously stream video and audio information to
data centres in ways that are completely opaque to children
and/or parents [54].
Although the need to provide a better design for children
is recognised by the recent development of regulations (such
as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4]) and
proposals for age-appropriate design for children [3], chil-
dren are only occasionally consulted in these efforts [5]. De-
signers, as well as policymakers, should recognise children’s
interests as well as the need to involve children [42, 53] in
the process of design and policymaking.
Implications for Privacy Tools Supporting Parents
and Children
Our findings confirmed children’s ability to recognise certain
privacy risks. But we need to expand children’s understand-
ing of implicit data collection risks. Current tools for safe-
guarding children online mainly focus on enabling parents
to take control or monitor children’s online activities [41,
77]. Related research with parents and their teenagers have
shown that current tools often work against parents’ and
children’s values of privacy, and they would prefer tools
to facilitate parental mediation of children’s use of tech-
nologies rather than simply providing surveillance capa-
bilities [76, 77]. Parental involvement leading to improved
learning outcomes of children is extensively supported by
existing literature [18, 74]; however, parents feel they are
poorly supported in dealing with challenges related to fa-
cilitating their children’s use of digital technologies [46].
Most of the time they rely on self-guided online searches,
rather than being informed by systematic, comprehensive
and reliable resources [46]. Future tool development should
consider both scaffolding children’s knowledge acquisition
and facilitating the active involvement of the parents.
Several studies have looked into how to facilitate chil-
dren’s learning of online privacy and safety through a co-
learning process between parents and children [34, 81], and
demonstrated their effectiveness for increasing children’s
risk recognition and coping. However, the difficulty of recog-
nising data tracking risks is not unique to children, suggest-
ing the need for better tools to help provide some trans-
parency to adults and children alike [7, 72]. Greater trans-
parency could also support children’s ability to make sense of
the personalisation and recommendation behaviours of on-
line platforms that dominate our information consumption
online [25], by providing information about why or by whom
particular content was recommended. However, given chil-
dren’s development stages, especially those under 11, they
probably have less ability to fully recognise the implications
of these risks. Therefore, tools designers should not only help
parents mediate children’s understanding of online risks but
also help them to develop “big data” literacy [35] to start to
understand how information derived from online activities
are captured, retained and repurposed by various entities,
as well as the potential risks such retention, processing, and
use carry.
Reflection on Methods
Focus groups have been instrumental in our understanding
of children’s perception of risks and their way of describing
these risks. This approach has provided an open setting to
incentivise children’s sharing of their experiences, and par-
ticularly those of their peers, like friends or siblings. In com-
parison to previous studies [41, 83], in which semi-structured
interviews with parents and children were the main method
used, our focus group studies with children inspired more
discussions about children’s and their peers’ experiences
with online privacy risks. These have been a principal means
for us to have a deeper understanding of how children’s risk
coping strategies may vary under different contexts.
The CI framework provides a useful philosophical frame-
work for understanding the social and ethical aspects of pri-
vacy. However, translating it into a technical implementation
is not straightforward [12]. Most of the previous work has
used context as a synonym for a scenario or situation, to un-
derstand users’ privacy preferences and expectations [75, 80].
Others have used the concept to design social platforms that
can adapt to different social norms in different spheres (like
families, friends, colleagues etc) [21, 71].
Kumar et al. [42] have applied the normative aspect of the
CI framework to assessing how well children can recognise
the actors, information entities and information transforma-
tions involved in a context. This work extends and builds
on their findings: by examining children’s privacy mental
models, we focused on the terms used by the children for
describing privacy contexts and related factors (e.g. the in-
formation that is sensitive to them or the organisations that
are regarded as threatening). We look for a deeper under-
standing of both the types of risks that children struggled to
recognise (such as third-party tracking) and to describe these
accurately. This has been an effective process to understand
children’s current knowledge gaps and the key information
that is needed to facilitate their future development of pri-
vacy knowledge.
8 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We acknowledge that it is difficult to generalise our findings
given the sample size and study population. First, schools and
parents who chose to participate in the study may already
be more interested in the topic than the average population.
This may have impacted the a priori awareness of online
privacy risks our participants had. Secondly, whilst we did
not collect information about participants’ family income,
the families’ areas of residences were centred in an afflu-
ent area near a university. This may have resulted in our
findings reflecting a greater privacy literacy than the gen-
eral population, not only due to familial influences, but also
due to local schools. Our primary goal, however, was not to
measure the degree of literacy or concern, but the gaps of
greatest concern and potential for new tools to help. While
we did not explicitly look at age-specific differences, infor-
mally we noticed possible differences we wish to examine
further in future work; e.g. children older than eight seem-
ingly demonstrating a richer vocabulary to describe risks.
Finally, when the focus group studies were carried out at
schools, a teaching assistant or a class teacher was often
present in the room, for safeguarding reasons. Children may
have moderated their responses in these settings.
Future work also aims to explore how we may design ap-
proaches that could enable children to expand their knowl-
edge about online privacy risks in two ways: new knowledge
scaffolding based upon children’s actual understanding, and
addressing the critical knowledge gap about online promo-
tions and data tracking. Our study emphasises the impor-
tance of scaffolding children’s understanding of risks and
privacy strategies. Given children’s role in these digital tech-
nologies, we intend to use co-design workshops [42, 53],
involving children, parents, teachers, and designers of educa-
tional games, to explore approaches to scaffolding children’s
privacy knowledge.
9 CONCLUSION
Inspired by the ZPD theory and the Contextual Integrity
framework, our work examined children’s current knowl-
edge about privacy risks online and how childrenmay ormay
not have fully recognised online privacy risks when adopt-
ing particular strategies. Our results showed that children’s
ability to fully recognise privacy risks has a direct impact
on their ability to consistently describe and manage these
risks: when they only vaguely recognised the risks, they
would try to make sense out of them using their knowledge
or experiences, but would not always take effective action.
Expanding our understanding of children’s perceptions of
risks thus advances the goal of facilitating a child’s ability to
cope with risks from a young age, scaffolding this through
a knowledge acquisition, rather than a restrictive approach.
We hope that our findings will support both designers of new
privacy tools for children, as well as those of educational
material seeking to address gaps in their understanding of
risks and data use online.
Providing better privacy-by-design guidelines for protect-
ing children is essential both to influence, and meet the as-
pirational goals of data protection (DP) initiatives being set
forth around the globe. Although the GDPR in the EU pro-
tects the use of children’s data, the Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act (COPPA) in the US has yet to provide
an explicit regulation of third-party tracking. This study has
highlighted some potential avenues by which future tools
might, through greater data literacy, lay the foundation for
having children understand, and start to exercise, the rights
such DP regulation grant them.
10 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank participant schools and children for their time,
and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback. This work
was supported by the EPSRC Impact Acceleration Account
KOALA (EP/R511742/1).
REFERENCES
[1] [n. d.]. Must Have Apps for Kids Under Five. https://www.lifewire.
com/great-apps-for-kids-5-and-under-4152990. Accessed: 2018-12-15.
[2] 2013. Zero to Eight: Children’s Media Use in America 2013. Technical
Report. Common Sense Media. https://www.commonsensemedia.org/
research/zero-to-eight-childrens-media-use-in-america-2013
[3] 2018. Call for evidence - Age Appropriate Design Code.
https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/ico-and-stakeholder-consultations/
call-for-evidence-age-appropriate-design-code/. Accessed: 2018-09.
[4] 2018. Children and the GDPR. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/
guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/
children-and-the-gdpr/. Accessed: 2018-08.
[5] 2018. Children’s rights and the GDPR – are the
new consultations creating light or further confu-
sion? http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/05/11/
childrens-rights-and-the-gdpr-are-the-new-consultations-creating-light-or-further-confusion/.
Accessed: 2018-08.
[6] 2018. Instagram Help Center. https://help.instagram.com/
116024195217477. Accessed: 2018-08.
[7] Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte, and George Loewenstein.
2015. Privacy and human behavior in the age of information. Science
347, 6221 (2015), 509–514.
[8] Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R Taylor, and Liad Wagman. 2016. The
economics of privacy. Journal of Economic Literature 52, 2 (2016).
[9] Birch Ann. 2000. The Developmental Psychology-from infancy to
adulthood. Bucharest: The Technical Publishing House (2000).
[10] Louise Barkhuus. 2012. The mismeasurement of privacy: using con-
textual integrity to reconsider privacy in HCI. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM,
367–376.
[11] Susanne Barth and Menno DT De Jong. 2017. The privacy paradox–
Investigating discrepancies between expressed privacy concerns and
actual online behavior–A systematic literature review. Telematics and
Informatics 34, 7 (2017), 1038–1058.
[12] Sebastian Benthall, Seda Gürses, Helen Nissenbaum, Cornell Tech, and
NYU Steinhardt MCC. 2017. Contextual Integrity through the Lens of
Computer Science. Foundations and Trends in Privacy and Security 2
(2017), 1–69.
[13] Reuben Binns, Ulrik Lyngs, Max van Kleek, Jun Zhao, Timothy Libert,
and Nigel Shadbolt. 2018. Third party tracking in the mobile ecosystem.
Proceedings of the 10th International ACM Web Science Conference 2018
(2018).
[14] Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein.
2013. Misplaced confidences privacy and the control paradox. Social
Psychological and Personality Science 4, 3 (2013), 340–347.
[15] Tanya Byron. 2010. Do we have safer children in a digital world? A
review of progress since the 2008 Byron Review. (2010).
[16] Seth Chaiklin. 2003. The zone of proximal development in Vygotsky’s
analysis of learning and instruction. Vygotsky’s educational theory in
cultural context 1 (2003), 39–64.
[17] Michael Chandler, Anna S Fritz, and Suzanne Hala. 1989. Small-scale
deceit: Deception as a marker of two-, three-, and four-year-olds’ early
theories of mind. Child development (1989), 1263–1277.
[18] Cecilia Sin-Sze Cheung and Eva M Pomerantz. 2011. Parents’ involve-
ment in children’s learning in the United States and China: Implications
for children’s academic and emotional adjustment. Child development
82, 3 (2011), 932–950.
[19] Malinda J Colwell, Kimberly Corson, Anuradha Sastry, and Holly
Wright. 2016. Secret keepers: children’s theory of mind and their
conception of secrecy. Early Child Development and Care 186, 3 (2016),
369–381.
[20] Federal Trade Commission et al. 2015. Kids’ Apps Disclosures Revis-
ited.
[21] Natalia Criado and Jose M Such. 2015. Implicit contextual integrity in
online social networks. Information Sciences 325 (2015), 48–69.
[22] Harry Daniels. 2005. An introduction to Vygotsky. Psychology Press.
[23] Allison Druin. 1999. The Role of Children in the Design Technology.
Technical Report.
[24] Jill Dunn, Colette Gray, Pamela Moffett, and Denise Mitchell. 2018.
‘It’s more funner than doing work’: children’s perspectives on using
tablet computers in the early years of school. Early Child Development
and Care 188, 6 (2018), 819–831.
[25] Catherine D’Ignazio and Rahul Bhargava. 2015. Approaches to build-
ing big data literacy. In Proceedings of the Bloomberg Data for Good
Exchange Conference.
[26] Lesley-Anne Ey and C Glenn Cupit. 2011. Exploring young children’s
understanding of risks associated with Internet usage and their con-
cepts of management strategies. Journal of Early Childhood Research
9, 1 (2011), 53–65.
[27] Jennifer Fane, Colin MacDougall, Jessie Jovanovic, Gerry Redmond,
and Lisa Gibbs. 2018. Exploring the use of emoji as a visual research
method for eliciting young children’s voices in childhood research.
Early Child Development and Care 188, 3 (2018), 359–374.
[28] Joseph L Fleiss. 1971. Measuring nominal scale agreement among
many raters. Psychological bulletin 76, 5 (1971), 378.
[29] Melissa Freeman and Sandra Mathison. 2008. Researching children’s
experiences. The Guilford Press.
[30] Arup Kumar Ghosh, Karla Badillo-Urquiola, Shion Guha, Joseph J.
LaViola Jr, and Pamela J. Wisniewski. 2018. Safety vs. Surveillance:
What Children Have to Say About Mobile Apps for Parental Control. In
Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 124, 14 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173698
[31] Faith Gibson. 2007. Conducting focus groups with children and young
people: strategies for success. Journal of research in nursing 12, 5 (2007),
473–483.
[32] Sheila Greene andDianeHogan. 2005. Researching children’s experience:
Approaches and methods. Sage.
[33] Nancy G Guerra, Kirk RWilliams, and Shelly Sadek. 2011. Understand-
ing bullying and victimization during childhood and adolescence: A
mixed methods study. Child development 82, 1 (2011), 295–310.
[34] Yasmeen Hashish, Andrea Bunt, and James E Young. 2014. Involving
children in content control: a collaborative and education-oriented
content filtering approach. In Proceedings of the 32nd annual ACM
conference on Human factors in computing systems. ACM, 1797–1806.
[35] Samantha Hautea, Sayamindu Dasgupta, and Benjamin Mako Hill.
2017. Youth perspectives on critical data literacies. In Proceedings of
the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM,
919–930.
[36] Alexis Hiniker, Hyewon Suh, Sabina Cao, and Julie A Kientz. 2016.
Screen time tantrums: how families manage screen media experiences
for toddlers and preschoolers. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 648–660.
[37] Haiyan Jia, Pamela J. Wisniewski, Heng Xu, Mary Beth Rosson, and
John M. Carroll. 2015. Risk-taking As a Learning Process for Shaping
Teen’s Online Information Privacy Behaviors. In Proceedings of the
18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work &#38;
Social Computing (CSCW ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 583–599.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2675133.2675287
[38] Steve Jones, Camille Johnson-Yale, Sarah Millermaier, and Fran-
cisco Seoane Pérez. 2009. US college students’ Internet use: Race,
gender and digital divides. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communica-
tion 14, 2 (2009), 244–264.
[39] Sharon Judge, Kimberly Floyd, and Tara Jeffs. 2015. Using mobile
media devices and apps to promote young children’s learning. In
Young Children and Families in the information age. Springer, 117–131.
[40] Beeban Kidron, Anghrarad Rudkin, Miranda Wolpert, Joanna R. Adler,
Andrew K. Przybylski, Elvira Perez Vallejos, Henrietta Bowden-Jones,
Joshua J. Chauvin, Kathryn L. Mills, Marina Jirotka, and Julian Childs.
2017. Digital Childhood: Addressing Childhood Development Milestones
in the Digital Environment. Technical Report. 5Rights.
[41] Priya Kumar, Shalmali Milind naik, Utkarsha Ramesh Devkar, Marshini
Chetty, Tamara L. Clegg, and Jessica Vitak. 2018. No Telling Passcodes
Out Because They’re Private?: Understanding Children’s Mental Mod-
els of Privacy and Security Online. In Proceedings of ACM Human-
Computer Interaction (CSCW ’18 Online First). ACM.
[42] Priya Kumar, Jessica Vitak, Marshini Chetty, Tamara L Clegg, Jonathan
Yang, Brenna McNally, and Elizabeth Bonsignore. 2018. Co-designing
online privacy-related games and stories with children. In Proceedings
of the 17th Annual ACM Conference on Interaction Design and Children
(IDC’18). doi, Vol. 10.
[43] Michael E Kummer and Patrick Schulte. 2016. When private infor-
mation settles the bill: Money and privacy in Google’s market for
smartphone applications. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research
Discussion Paper 16-031 (2016).
[44] Sonia Livingstone. 2006. Children’s privacy online: experimenting
with boundaries within and beyond the family. (2006).
[45] Sonia Livingstone. 2018. Children: a special case for privacy? Interme-
dia 46, 2 (2018), 18–23.
[46] Sonia Livingstone, Alicia Blum-Ross, Jennifer Pavlick, and Kjartan
Olafsson. 2018. In the digital home, how do parents support their children
and who supports them? Technical Report. LSE.
[47] Sonia Livingstone, Alicia Blum-Ross, and Dongmiao Zhang. 2018.
What do parents think, and do, about their children’s online privacy?
Technical Report. LSE.
[48] Sonia Livingstone, Julia Davidson, Joanne Bryce, Saqba Batool, Ciaran
Haughton, and Anulekha Nandi. 2017. Children’s online activities, risks
and safety: a literature review by the UKCCIS evidence group. Technical
Report. UKCCIS evidence group.
[49] Sonia Livingstone and Kjartan Olafsson. 2018. When do parents think
their child is ready to use the internet independently? Technical Report.
LSE.
[50] Sonia Livingstone, Mariya Stoilova, and Rishita Nandagiri. 2018. Con-
ceptualising privacy online: what do, and what should, children un-
derstand? Parenting for a Digital Future (2018), 1–4.
[51] May O Lwin, Andrea JS Stanaland, and Anthony D Miyazaki. 2008.
Protecting children’s privacy online: How parental mediation strate-
gies affect website safeguard effectiveness. Journal of Retailing 84, 2
(2008), 205–217.
[52] Sana Maqsood, Christine Mekhail, and Sonia Chiasson. 2018. A Day
in the Life of Jos: A Web-based Game to Increase Children’s Digital
Literacy. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Interaction
Design and Children. ACM, 241–252.
[53] Brenna McNally, Priya Kumar, Chelsea Hordatt, Matthew Louis Mau-
riello, Shalmali Naik, Leyla Norooz, Alazandra Shorter, Evan Golub,
and Allison Druin. 2018. Co-designing Mobile Online Safety Appli-
cations with Children. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 523.
[54] Emily McReynolds, Sarah Hubbard, Timothy Lau, Aditya Saraf, Maya
Cakmak, and Franziska Roesner. 2017. Toys that Listen: A Study of
Parents, Children, and Internet-Connected Toys. In Proceedings of the
2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM,
5197–5207.
[55] LindaMiller and Linda Pound. 2010. Theories and approaches to learning
in the early years. Sage.
[56] Faye Mishna, Michael Saini, and Steven Solomon. 2009. Ongoing and
online: Children and youth’s perceptions of cyber bullying. Children
and Youth Services Review 31, 12 (2009), 1222–1228.
[57] MyfanwyMorgan, Sara Gibbs, Krista Maxwell, and Nicky Britten. 2002.
Hearing children’s voices: methodological issues in conducting focus
groups with children aged 7-11 years. Qualitative research 2, 1 (2002),
5–20.
[58] Michelle M Neumann and David L Neumann. 2014. Touch screen
tablets and emergent literacy. Early Childhood Education Journal 42, 4
(2014), 231–239.
[59] Helen Nissenbaum. 2004. Privacy as contextual integrity. Wash. L. Rev.
79 (2004), 119.
[60] ofcom.org. 2017. Children and parents: media use and attitude re-
port. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/108182/
children-parents-media-use-attitudes-2017.pdf
[61] Kieron OHara. 2016. The Seven Veils of Privacy. IEEE Internet Com-
puting 20, 2 (2016), 86–91.
[62] Luci Pangrazio and Neil Selwyn. 2017. ‘My Data, My Bad ...’: Young
People’s Personal Data Understandings and (Counter)Practices. In
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Social Media & Society
(#SMSociety17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 52, 5 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3097286.3097338
[63] Stamatis Papadakis, Michail Kalogiannakis, and Nicholas Zaranis. 2016.
Comparing tablets and PCs in teaching mathematics: an attempt to im-
provemathematics competence in early childhood education. Preschool
Prim. Educ 4, 2 (2016), 241–253.
[64] Chris Quintana, Brian J Reiser, Elizabeth A Davis, Joseph Krajcik,
Eric Fretz, Ravit Golan Duncan, Eleni Kyza, Daniel Edelson, and Elliot
Soloway. 2004. A scaffolding design framework for software to support
science inquiry. The journal of the learning sciences 13, 3 (2004), 337–
386.
[65] Irwin Reyes, Primal Wiesekera, Abbas Razaghpanah, Joel Reardon,
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Serge Egelman, and Christian Kreibich.
2017. “Is Our Children’s Apps Learning?” Automatically Detecting
COPPAViolations. InWorkshop on Technology and Consumer Protection
(ConPro 2017), in conjunction with the 38th IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy.
[66] Irwin Reyes, Primal Wijesekera, Joel Reardon, Amit Elazari Bar On,
Abbas Razaghpanah, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, and Serge Egelman.
2018. “Won’t Somebody Think of the Children?” Examining COPPA
Compliance at Scale. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
2018, 3 (2018), 63–83.
[67] John Schacter and Booil Jo. 2016. Improving low-income preschoolers
mathematics achievement with Math Shelf, a preschool tablet com-
puter curriculum. Computers in Human Behavior 55 (2016), 223–229.
[68] Cristiana S. Silva, Glívia A.R. Barbosa, Ismael S. Silva, Tatiane S. Silva,
FernandoMourão, and Flávio Coutinho. 2017. Privacy for Children and
Teenagers on Social Networks from a Usability Perspective: A Case
Study on Facebook. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Web Science
Conference (WebSci ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 63–71. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3091478.3091479
[69] Daniel J Solove. 2008. Understanding privacy. (2008).
[70] David W Stewart and Prem N Shamdasani. 2014. Focus groups: Theory
and practice. Vol. 20. Sage publications.
[71] Matt Tierney and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian. 2014. Realizing
privacy by definition in social networks. In Proceedings of 5th Asia-
Pacific Workshop on Systems. ACM, 6.
[72] Max Van Kleek, Reuben Binns, Jun Zhao, and Nigel Shadbolt. [n. d.]. X-
Ray Refine: Supporting the Exploration and Refinement of Information
Exposure Resulting from Smartphone Apps. In Proceedings of 2018 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. to appear.
[73] Rick Wash. 2010. Folk Models of Home Computer Security.. In SOUPS.
1–16.
[74] Margy Whalley. 2017. Involving Parents in Their Children’s Learning:
A Knowledge-Sharing Approach. Sage.
[75] Primal Wijesekera, Arjun Baokar, Ashkan Hosseini, Serge Egelman,
David Wagner, and Konstantin Beznosov. 2015. Android Permissions
Remystified: A Field Study on Contextual Integrity.. In USENIX Security
Symposium. 499–514.
[76] Pamela Wisniewski. 2018. The Privacy Paradox of Adolescent Online
Safety: A Matter of Risk Prevention or Risk Resilience? IEEE Security
& Privacy 16, 2 (2018), 86–90.
[77] Pamela Wisniewski, Arup Kumar Ghosh, Heng Xu, Mary Beth Rosson,
and John M Carroll. 2017. Parental Control vs. Teen Self-Regulation: Is
there a middle ground for mobile online safety?. In Proceedings of the
2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and
Social Computing. ACM, 51–69.
[78] Pamela J Wisniewski, Heng Xu, Mary Beth Rosson, and John M Carroll.
2017. Parents Just Don’t Understand: Why Teens Don’t Talk to Parents
about Their Online Risk Experiences.. In CSCW. 523–540.
[79] Yaxing Yao, Davide Lo Re, and YangWang. 2017. Folk Models of Online
Behavioral Advertising.. In CSCW. 1957–1969.
[80] Frances Zhang, Fuming Shih, and Daniel Weitzner. 2013. No surprises:
measuring intrusiveness of smartphone applications by detecting ob-
jective context deviations. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on
Workshop on privacy in the electronic society. ACM, 291–296.
[81] Leah Zhang-Kennedy, Yomna Abdelaziz, and Sonia Chiasson. 2017.
Cyberheroes: The design and evaluation of an interactive ebook to
educate children about online privacy. International Journal of Child-
Computer Interaction (2017).
[82] Leah Zhang-Kennedy and Sonia Chiasson. 2016. Teaching with an
Interactive E-book to Improve Children’s Online Privacy Knowledge.
In Proceedings of the The 15th International Conference on Interaction
Design and Children (IDC ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 506–511.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2930674.2935984
[83] Leah Zhang-Kennedy, Christine Mekhail, Yomna Abdelaziz, and Sonia
Chiasson. 2016. From Nosy Little Brothers to Stranger-Danger: Chil-
dren and Parents’ Perception of Mobile Threats. In Proceedings of the
The 15th International Conference on Interaction Design and Children.
ACM, 388–399.
